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which are admittedly in a state of flux . The treatment of the law
as it stands, quite apart from the fact that it may so rapidly change
is always accompanied by an absence of a sense of direction . To
know where the law is going or is probably going, one must know
the history by which it came to its present state of development-
in this way alone can an estimate be made with any degree of
accuracy of the course of the law in times to come. If the members
of the legal profession accept the responsibility for the state of the
law (and who should be better able to evolve proper laws) a greater
degree of conscious effort must be put forth by the profession
towards the shaping of the law. And a textbook by an author who
has familiarized himself with one phase of law as Mr. Rogers has
done might well contain the inspiration for the changes in law
which the members of the legal profession should seek to ac-
complish .
ARTHUR KELLY*
Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecutions. Edited by ARTHUR L.
HARDING. Dallas : Southern Methodist University Press. 1959 .
Pp . ix, 121 . ($3.00 U.S.)
This is a collection of four essays based on papers delivered by
distinguished American legal scholars at the 1958 Conference on
Law in Society held at Southern Methodist University . The essays
are directed to the informed and inquiring citizen, layman as well
as lawyer and concern what the editor aptly describes as "the
minimum decencies of criminal prosecution" . Much ofthe book is
naturally concerned with the problem of federal control over state
courts which depends on the "due process of law" provision of
the Bill of Rights . At the moment "due process" is not a term of
art in Canadian jurisprudence and even if such a phrase be in-
corporated in a Canadian Bill of Rights, we have no reason to
anticipate a constitutional struggle between province and Domin-
ion, criminal law being within the exclusive legislative authority
of the Dominion. Of what interest then is this book to the Canad-
ian citizen, lawyer or layman? The answer is clear. Whether or
not we acquire the technical phrase "due process" to describe
them, "the minimum decencies" should be of interest to us all .
Further, such an authoritative study of the constitutional problems
facing the American lawyer will be of the greatest value to those
of us who specialize in criminal work and are faced with the prob-
lem of working with the many American decisions on due process.
*Arthur Kelly, Q.C ., Toronto .
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Of especial value in this regard is the first essay by the editor, an
historical study of the basic constitutional issues .
The remaining essays deal with specific protection afforded an
accused person . Thus, the second essay by William 1i4 . Beaney,
concerns the right of an accused person to have the assistance of
counsel in his defence . This right, guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment, was construed as nothing more than the right to retain
counsel until 1938 when in Johnson v. Zerbstl the Supreme Court
held that in every federal criminal case, the accused must either
have counsel appointed by the court, where indigency made re-
tention of counsel impossible, or must waive counsel after proper
instruction by the judge . According to the author, there was no
professional nor public criticism of this generous interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment. It was apparently accepted that the ad-
versary system functions best with each side represented by com-
petent counsel . Critics of our present legal aid schemes in the
various provinces may find ammunition in the author's reference
to the solution furnished by the public defender system presently
used with great success in the city of Los Angeles and other areas
in the United States . As he points out, "it is hard to conclude that
there are differences between those using the public defender plan
and the rest of the United States which prevent widespread adop-
tion of this solution" (p . 55) .
The third essay, on compulsory self-incrimination, emphasizes
the highly unsatisfactory state of the law of evidence in this regard .
Professor Fairman, the author, holds, as I do, that the rule ex-
cluding coerced confessions depends largely, if not exclusively, on
public policy against the incorporation of coercion as part of our
judicial process . In other words, the rule excluding involuntary
confessions is aimed at the elimination of third-degree methods
on the part of the police . In this respect, it- is interesting to note
that the author endorses the proposal made by Dean Roscoe
Pound, in 1934, 2 of a statutory procedure for questioning a sus-
pect before a magistrate, under suitable safeguards . Professor
Fairman links this liability to be questioned with a right to refuse
to answer and a liability to have such failure commented on by
the judge at trial . In 1940, Dr. C. A. Wright' proposed that our
rules of evidence be amended so as to afford an accused protection
from having his record, if any, exposed on entering the witness-
box under the guise of testing his credibility. 4 He suggested that
at the same time the judge should be given power to comment on
1 (1938), 304 U.S . 458 .
2 Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime (1934),
24 J. of Criminal L. & Criminology 1014 .
9 (1940), .18 Can. Bar Rev. 808 .
4 The construction placed upon s . 12 of the Canada Evidence Act,
R.S.C ., 1952, c 307 is too notorious to require exposition .
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the failure of an accused to testify. This is substantially the posi-
tion in England and it may be that this indirect withdrawal of the
present privilege not to give evidence would be more acceptable
to the Canadian lawyer and citizen than Professor Fairman's
proposal .
The final essay follows naturally from this discussion of the
indirect protection of the citizen's freedom from unlawful coer-
cion, the late Professor Reynard taking as his topic "The Right
of Privacy" . In England, where every man's home is his castle,
evidence obtained through a police wire-tap was used in the recent
"trial" of a doctor for professional misconduct before the General
Medical Council with the apparent approval of the Home Secre-
tary. While, in Canada, wiretapping has not yet presented a
problem, there has been a recent tendency by the police to limit
the extent of the citizen's right to privacy by the indirect use of
provincial legislation, e.g. to use a right of search conferred by
the Ontario Liquor Control Act for the purposes of general search .
Such Canadian cases as R. v. McNamara,s A.G . for Quebec v.
Begins and R. v. St . Lawrence,' heavily reinforced by such Privy
Council authority as Kuruma v. R.,$ tend to give the police every
encouragement by admitting real evidence procured by tortious
or even criminal violation of a suspect's rights . On the whole, the
American cases tend the other way, with a marked difference
between practice in matters within federal jurisdiction and those
within the jurisdiction of some of the states . As Professor Reynard
notes
On the one hand there is society's deep and abiding concern for the
individual's right of privacy. On the other, there is an equivalent
interest in the prompt and effective apprehension of criminals. Neither
interest should be sacrificed on the altar of the other. (p . 117)
This book will be of interest and value to the intelligent reader
rightly concerned with a proper accommodation of the rights of
citizen and society.
J . D. MORTON
5 [1951] O.R . 6, affirmed . a t p . 11 . e [1955] S.C.R . 593 .
7 [1949] O.R . 215 . a [1955] 1 All E.R. 236 (P.C .)
*J . D . Morton, The Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto .
